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Introduction  
Mobilization against Europe’s political establishments is on the rise. This has naturally 
focused the attention of scholars and policy-makers on the emergence of protest parties 
and movements. Much discussion has centred on the electoral successes and prospects 
of populist radical right parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik or the True Finns or groupings 
on the radical left like SYRIZA in Greece (Jordan 2010, Wolin 2011). Fears of a radical 
populist electoral backslash have been especially marked in relation to Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), whose weaker economies and less consolidated democracies 
appear fertile ground for radical-right and illiberal populist parties after the falling away 
of EU accession conditionalities (Rupnik 2007, Bohle & Greskovits 2009). 
However, alongside conventional radical populists a major new protest phenomenon has 
appeared which so far has been relatively under-researched: successful new parties, 
which combine mainstream ideology on economic and socio-cultural issues with fierce 
anti-establishment rhetoric and demands for political reform, transparency and new 
ways of ‘doing politics’. Such parties matter politically. They can achieve overnight 
electoral breakthroughs on a scale sufficient to restructure party systems and unlike 
radical populist groupings,   even when they do not, often have high coalition potential. 
Such protest-oriented parties may pose a challenge for democracy, Despite their 
success, they often struggle to govern and can rapidly break up, sometimes preparing 
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the ground for new protest parties, potentially feeding a spiral of protest and instability 
(Deegan-Krause 2007, Deegan Krause & Haughton 2009). 
New anti-establishment parties of this kind are increasingly breaking through in 
established democracies, Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement being perhaps the most 
spectacular example. However, they have been a feature across the political landscape 
of Central and Eastern Europe for some years (Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová & Bútorová 
2013). Parties such as Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria founded by the 
notional heir to the Bulgarian throne (Barany 2002) or Res Publica in Estonia 
(Taagepera 2006) enjoyed electoral landslides months after launching in 2001 and 2003 
and immediately became leading parties of the government. Others, such as Freedom 
and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia (2010) or Public Affairs (VV, 2010) and the ANO 
movement of billionaire Andrej Babiš (2013) in the Czech Republic have achieved 
more modest success, but entered government coalitions. Elsewhere in CEE, however, 
such parties have been conspicuous by their marginality or absence. The experience of 
the CEE thus represents a natural laboratory for the comparative study of such parties, 
which cast an important light on the wider prospects of this emerging type of protest 
party. 
We term such parties anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs) and in this article we 
analyse the conditions under which their electoral breakthroughs occur using fuzzy-set 
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). We first discuss our conceptualisation of 
the anti-establishment reform party, briefly relating it to existing concepts such as 
populism, and discuss parties in CEE that we classify as AERPs. We then present the 
fsQCA method and briefly review its use in analysing the comparative success of 
emergent parties across different national and electoral contexts. We then consider a 
range of causal conditions relevant to AERPs’ success including economic crisis, 
corruption and party system instability and, using fsQCA, pick out those configurations 
leading to AERP breakthrough. Contrary to our initial expectations we find that 
breakthroughs can occur during either good or bad economic times and that it is rising 
perceived corruption which is common to many economic and political contexts leading 
to AERP breakthrough.  
 
Anti-establishment reform parties 
As Deegan-Krause (2010) observes, despite much diversity, there are clear 
commonalities between many new parties that have broken through in recent elections 
in CEE making them:  
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… not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and 
anti-corruption emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a 
new party type … but with strong and intersecting elements of both.  
How can this phenomenon be conceptualised? Authors who have noticed the 
phenomenon have often viewed such parties as a sub-type of populism, speaking of 
‘new/centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches 2010), ‘centrist populism’ (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 
2007).  Others seen them more narrowly as based on a distinct issue dimension: 
Bågenholm (2013a) for example, terms them ‘anti-corruption parties’.  
We conceptualize these parties somewhat differently as anti-establishment reform 
parties which exhibit – to different extents – three core features: (1) a politics of 
mainstream reformism (2) usually framed in terms of anti-establishment appeal to 
voters; and (3) genuine organizational newness.  
By mainstream reformism we understand: firstly, that these parties are committed to 
mainstream models of liberal democracy and the market economy and display neither 
the populist radical right’s inclination to ‘illiberal democracy’, ethnocentrism and social 
conservatism (Mudde 2007) nor the anti-capitalism of the radical left (March & Mudde 
2005). Secondly, AERPs display a strong commitment to political reform, seeking to 
reform political institutions or change the way politics is conducted. Thus depending on 
context, they may make appeals to fight corruption; replace corrupt or inefficient elites; 
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create new democratic structures; or simply offer novelty of political style – a ‘project 
of newness’ as Sikk (2012) terms it.  
Following Abedi (2004: 12) we further understand AERPs as anti-establishment parties: 
parties which present themselves as challengers to establishment parties and emphasize 
the divide between society and the political establishment.  
The third element of our definition is that organizationally AERPs are ‘genuinely new’. 
Here we apply, in slightly extended form,f Sikk’s (2005: 399) definition of new parties 
as those that are ‘not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel 
name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics 
among their major members’ (Sikk 2005: 399). We thus exclude alliances and mergers 
between established parties and parties resulting from breakaways from established 
parties.
 1
 
Our stress on anti-establishment stance of AERPs overlaps with the widely used 
concept of ‘populism’. However, for a number of reasons we avoid this label. Even 
when clearly and minimally defined (see Mudde 2004:542) the concept tends conflate 
anti-establishment appeal with a set of moralistic anti-political appeals. While often 
empirically associated, these are, we contend, conceptually distinct and do not logically 
imply one another, leading to empirical miscategorisation. Although often labelled 
‘populist’, few AERPs make the strongly moralistic distinctions between the political 
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elite and the pure unsullied People said to be a defining characteristic of populist 
parties. We also take issue with the term’s normative connotations (see Sikk 2010 for 
further discussion).  
We thus use the concept of AERP as a broad working category, whose validity will be 
tested by the search for common causal patterns. To identify AERPs empirically we 
first identify genuinely new parties and eliminate those regarded as radical-right or 
radical-left in the literature (Mudde 2007, March 2011) or whose programmes or 
declarations clearly identify them as such. We then examined party programmes and 
statements and used case knowledge to distinguish those new parties making anti-
establishment reformist appeals from other new parties. We thus excluded a number of 
new partiers, including radical right groupings (League of Polish Families 2001, Ataka, 
Bulgaria 2005 and Jobbik, Hungary 2010) and Green parties (Estonia 2007, Czech 
Republic 2006). 
Strikingly, however, the large majority of successful genuinely new parties in CEE have 
been AERPs with only a minority of successful new parties in the region emerging on 
the radical right. Although potentially limiting leverage for distinguishing the conditions 
of AERP success from those of other types of anti-establishment party, this does this 
reduce our study to a generic study of new parties Although different types of 
successful new party may share some causal drivers, AERPs are a conceptually distinct 
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subset of new parties whose success is encompassed by a distinct range of causal 
conditions
2
 which we study through a cross-national, cross-election comparison of 
distinct pathways. 
We identified 21 successful AERPs in parliamentary elections in CEE between 1994 
and 2012.In all instances, we refer to a party at the time of the parliamentary election in 
question as CEE parties, both new and established, can experience considerable changes 
in their identity and programmatic appeals. 
Our data clearly suggests that AERP breakthrough is largely a phenomenon of the 
approximately the last 15 years. This fits the observations of Pop-Eleches regarding the 
timing of the success of ‘unconventional parties’ in CEE, which he explains in broad 
aggregate terms by the dynamics of ‘third generation’ post-communist elections: having 
voted into office and become disappointed with the performance of conventional parties 
of left and right in successive elections, voters are ready to turn to unconventional new 
parties (Pop-Eleches 2010: 223).  We accept this logic and focus on ‘third generation’ 
elections to the lower houses of CEE parliaments, which took place between September 
1997 and December 2012. We list elections and AERPs covered in Table 1.
3
  
No AERPs have materialized in Romania which we contend may be related to the 
markedly low level of democratic freedoms in that country compared to other EU states 
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(as indicated by Freedom House political rights and press freedom scores). For the sake 
of analytical clarity we therefore exclude this country from our analysis.  
Table 1. Electoral support for AERPs 1997-2012  
Election Successful AERP 
Votes 
% 
Set membership 
 in BREAKTHRU 
BGR 2001 Simenon II Movement (NDSV) 42.7 1.00 
BGR 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
BGR 2009 Movement for the European  
Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 39.7 1.00 
CZE 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
CZE 2006 –  0.0 0.00 
CZE 2010 TOP09, Public Affairs (VV) 27.6 1.00 
EST 1999 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2003 Res Publica 24.6 0.99 
EST 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2011 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 1998 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2010 Politics Can Be Different (LMP) 7.5 0.54 
LTU 2000 New Union (SL) 19.6 0.98 
LTU 2004 Labor Party (DP) 28.4 1.00 
LTU 2008 National Resurrection Party (TPP) 15.1 0.92 
LTU 2012 Way of Courage (DK) 9.8 0.70 
LVA 1998 New Party (JP) 7.3 0.53 
LVA 2002 New Era (JL) 24.0 0.99 
LVA 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2010 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2011 Zatler’s Reform Party (ZRP) 21.3 0.99 
POL 1997 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2001 Law and Justice (PiS) 9.5 0.68 
POL 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2011 Palikot Movement (RP) 10.5 0.74 
SVK 2002 SMER, Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) 21.5 0.99 
SVK 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
SVK 2010 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 12.2 0.82 
SVK 2012 Ordinary People (OLaNO) 11.4 0.79 
SVN 2008 –  0.0 0.00 
SVN 2011 Positive Slovenia (PS-LZJ),  
Virant List (DLGV) 36.9 1.00 
Source: European Elections Database and websites of national electoral authorities. 
Scores for parties with less than 4% were not used, resulting in formal raw score of 0.0. 
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QCA conditions 
For our analysis we use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a comparative 
technique which formalizes the logic of qualitative case-based comparison by linking 
configurations of causes (conditions) to effects (outcomes) using Boolean algebra and 
set theory (Ragin 2008, Rihoux & Ragin 2009). QCA is well suited to cross-national 
comparison of the success levels of a group of new parties as it can address both 
relatively high numbers of cases and high levels of casual complexity, capturing 
common causes, configurations of causes and multiple pathways to the same outcome 
(Redding & Viterna 1999, Veughlers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). 
We use the Fuzzy Set form of QCA (fsQCA) where cases are coded in terms of their 
degree of set membership in outcome and causal conditions, rather than the 
dichotomous presence or absence of conditions and outcomes as in the original Crisp 
Set version of QCA (csQCA, see Ragin 1987). Degrees of membership are expressed as 
values ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a 
‘crossover value’ of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. Although expressed numerically, 
the degrees of set membership are anchored in researchers’ theoretically-based 
judgments, with at least three key anchor points (0, 0.5 and 1) corresponding to a verbal 
description.
4
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Outcome: AERP electoral breakthrough (BREAKTHRU) 
AERPs have considerably greater vote winning potential than the niche or radical 
parties which earlier QCA studies of new party emergence focus on (Redding & Viterna 
1999, Veughlers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). In the elections we 
studied, there were two cases – Bulgaria 2001 and 2009 – where a single AERP was 
supported by more than a third of the electorate and one (Slovenia 2011) where the 
combined vote for AERPs was above this level. We set the threshold for full 
membership in the set BREAKTHRU at a level of massive electoral support (30 per 
cent of votes or more)
 
when the AERP becomes the first or second biggest party and 
hence a major party in a coalition government or a major opposition party.
5 We set the 
crossover point (0.5 set membership) at 7 per cent of the vote, which is safely sufficient 
to win parliamentary representation and to gain a share of seats roughly proportional to 
the party’s vote share, with the AERP becoming a minor governing or opposition party. 
We deem any election where there is no AERP vote to be fully out of the set (0).
6
 
Causal conditions 
Previous cross-national QCA studies of the comparative success of Green, far-right and 
ethnic parties (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veugelers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & 
Jiglau 2011) have drawn on ready-made propositions about causes of their success from 
a large existing literature. For an emerging group of parties such as AERPs, we 
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necessarily draw on a more diverse range of literature: the limited work on AERP-type 
parties (Učeň et al 2005, Sikk 2012, Bågenholm 2013a); our own case knowledge of 
CEE; the comparative literatures on new parties, populism, voting behaviour and 
democratic quality; and recent commentary by academic writers. 
Crisis and economic hard time. Many commentators have seen the recent rise of anti-
establishment parties across Europe as a response to the pressures exerted by the global 
economic downturn and the Eurozone crisis (Bartels 2013, Cramme 2013, Van Biezen 
& Wallace 2013: 294-7). Such expectations echo the political science literature which 
sees the inability of established actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions as a 
potential driver of protest voting for new parties. Such patterns of anti-incumbent 
economic voting generally are, moreover, sharper and more prevalent in CEE (Roberts 
2009). 
The global economic downturn that started in 2008-9 affected all CEE states following 
a period of economic expansion across the region. However, the downturn affected CEE 
states to markedly different degrees and built on pre-recession economies which also 
varied, particularly in terms of unemployment, reflecting different national trajectories 
of post-communist reform.  
We therefore look at two economic conditions expected to enhance the chances of 
AERP breakthrough: economic contraction (NOGRO) and rising unemployment 
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(INCUNEMP). Economic contraction (NOGRO) has both direct effects on consumption 
and levels of public provision and broader socio-political effects in stoking public 
discontent with incumbents. Extreme levels of economic contraction also create a sense 
of social crisis which may prompt voters to look for political alternatives. 
To operationalise economic contraction (NOGRO), we set the threshold for full set 
membership at a 5 per cent decline in a country’s GDP. The minimum threshold (‘fully 
out’) is set at a very high level of economic growth of 5 per cent, a phenomenon 
empirically observed in CEE states at various points since 1989. We set the cross-over 
point at 0 per cent annual change in GDP, corresponding to a stagnant economy.  
We look at the average level of economic growth over two previous years, as the effects 
of growth might become visible with a slight delay. Likewise, we expect that a period of 
economic downturn, especially if marked, may have socio-psychological impact felt 
even after the economy has subsequently picked up.  
A second consequence of economic downturn is increasing unemployment. This 
directly and immediately impacts those made redundant and their families, but arguably 
also affects wider groups of voters who fear for their own job security.
7
 Even at 
relatively low levels, sharply increasing unemployment represents a favourable 
condition for a turn to non-establishment politics and AERP breakthrough. Hence, we 
incorporate a condition of sharply increasing unemployment (INCUNEMP) which we 
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operationalise as the change in unemployment rates over the two years before the 
election. We set the maximum threshold corresponding to full membership in the set at 
an increase of 3 percentage points and the lower threshold (‘fully out of set’) at a 3 
percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. The crossover point is set at a near 
zero decrease of 0.5 percentage points.
8
  
These two economic conditions define four distinct socio-economic conjunctures 
characteristic of different countries and time periods: economic recession where GDP is 
falling and unemployment increasing (NOGRO*UNUNEMP); economic boom where 
GDP is increasing and unemployment falling (~NOGRO*~INUNEMP); restructuring or 
reform where the economy is growing but shedding jobs (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP); and 
recession with a social safety valve where unemployment falls despite economic 
contraction (NOGRO*~INCUNEMPs) spurred by mass withdrawal from the labour 
market due to emigration or policies promoting early retirement.  
Perceived corruption and distrust. In contrast to explanations which foreground 
economic recession and growth in unemployment, some authors have interpreted the 
rise of anti-establishment parties as a crisis of confidence in conventional democratic 
politics and the honesty and competence of elites (Kaldor & Selchow 2013, Žižek 
2013). Perceived corruption and the politicization of corruption have often been linked 
to the rise of AERP-like parties (Deegan-Krause 2010, Bågenholm 2013a) and, more 
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broadly, to anti-incumbent voting (Slomczynski & Shabad 2012, Bågenholm 2013b). 
Such anti-corruption sentiment may be understood both in terms of direct concern about 
corruption and an inchoate sense that political elites are self-serving, untrustworthy and 
unrepresentative. However, other writers (Blass, Roberts & Shaw 2012, Hooghe & 
Quintelier 2014) associate high levels of perceived corruption with demobilisation and 
non-participation benefiting established politicians.  
For this reason we distinguish two corruption-related conditions: a social perception of 
high corruption (HICORR) and a substantial increase in perceived levels of corruption 
(INCORR). For the purposes of QCA analysis we initially assume both to have a 
positive effect on AERP breakthrough.  
To operationalise levels of perceived corruption we use Transparency International’s 
annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Although CPI is often criticized as poorly 
reflecting ‘real’ levels of corruption, it is arguably a meaningful measure of the type of 
public concerns we wish to highlight.
9
 We place an election fully in the set of high 
levels of perceived corruption (HICORR) if the CPI score for the election year
10
 falls 
below 3.5, around the worst empirically achieved levels in CEE after 1999 (Romania 
and Bulgaria). A case is fully out of this set if CPI reaches 5.5 – a benchmark level 
based on the lowest levels of perceived corruption in the region after this date (achieved 
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only by Slovenia and Estonia). The crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.6, 
a figure close to the median corruption rating in CEE across the period.  
We deem a case to be fully in the set of elections where there has been a substantial 
increase in the level of perceived corruption (INCCORR) if the CPI score decreases by 
0.4 points, indicating a substantial deterioration in corruption. A case is fully out of the 
condition if a country’s CPI score increases by 0.4 points over the preceding two years 
– that is there is substantial improvement.11 We set the cross-over point at a decrease in 
the CPI score of just over zero (0.01), a point where there is neither improvement nor 
deterioration.
12
 
Political conditions. In earlier iterations of this work (Hanley & Sikk 2011) we included 
several conditions relating to the party-electoral context, including the presence of 
strong radical (right) populist parties and electoral turnout. However, these lacked 
explanatory power. With increased turnout, it was difficult satisfactorily to distinguish 
cause and effect, while most electorally significant radical parties in CEE were, on 
closer inspection, relatively niche groupings without insufficiently broad appeal to 
compete with AERPs.  
In this paper we retain just one such condition: previous levels of voting for genuinely 
new parties (HGENP). CEE parties and party systems are weakly institutionalised 
compared to other regions. However, there have been uneven patterns of party system 
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stability within the region (Powell & Tucker 2014) which may influence AERP 
breakthrough. We hypothesise that a history of support for genuinely new parties 
reflects the presence of a significant pool of ‘available’ voters, who may perceive an 
emerging AERP as a credible challenger. 
To operationalize this condition we took the maximum support for genuinely new 
parties in the previous two elections. A case is a full member of this condition (set 
membership 1.0) if combined support for genuinely new parties was 30 per cent or more 
– enough to generate one new major party or a number of minor breakthroughs. A case 
was fully out of this set if no genuinely new party won votes over this period. The 
crossover point was set at 19 per cent, equating to substantial support for one genuinely 
new party or more modest support for a range of less successful new parties.
13
 
 
Empirical analysis 
We used the QCA module in R (Dusa & Thiem 2012), to analyse BREAKTHRU in 
relation to these five socio-political conditions. As expected we found that there was no 
single necessary condition for AERP breakthrough. This confirms that AERP 
breakthroughs cannot be accounted for by encompassing narratives often used to frame 
them: popular reactions to economic hard times or a crisis of party systems and party 
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government. The two single conditions which came closest to being necessary were 
rising corruption (INCORR) and rising unemployment (INCUNEMP). However, their 
consistency scores of 0.721 and 0.622 respectively placed them far below what is 
required for causal necessity.
14
 One combination of two conditions (HICORR + 
INCORR) had high enough consistency (0.91) to be regarded as a necessary condition. 
This states that AERP breakthrough required either rising corruption or an already high 
level of corruption. However, its coverage of cases (0.58) was relatively low. This 
suggests that accounts which stress the bubbling up of anti-political, anti-corruption 
sentiments may come closer to general explanation but are far from sufficient.  
Seeking sufficient paths to AERP breakthrough.  
To find sufficient causal paths we generated a ‘truth table’ which shows the consistency 
of the 32 possible combinations of conditions relative to AERPs breakthrough (see 
online supplementary materials
15
). Individual elections are listed in the rows (causal 
combinations) with which they are most consistent. Rows of logically possible 
counterfactual combinations of conditions with no matching real life case (‘logic 
remainders’) are also shown. To determine which causal configurations should be 
classified as leading to BREAKTHRU we set a consistency cut-off at 0.78 This is 
slightly below the widely used cut-off of 0.8, but comfortably above the 0.75 minimum 
 
18 
recommended in the literature (Rihoux & Ragin 2008: 87-112, Schneider & Wagemann 
2012: 279) and reflects a natural gap in the distribution. 
In line with normal fsQCA practice we first examined the conservative (complex) 
solution produced using only empirically-occurring cases. The conservative solution 
had a high level of consistency (0.85) and relatively broad coverage (0.79 and identified 
five relatively complex sufficient causal paths for AERP breakthrough. We then 
simplified our solution by incorporating counter-factual cases. We formulated a 
parsimonious solution including all such counterfactual ‘logical remainders’ and an 
intermediate solution incorporating only ‘good counterfactuals’ (Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012: 168-175,199) offering a middle way between parsimony and 
empirical complexity.
16
  
The ‘easy’ or ‘good’ counterfactuals used in the intermediate solution require clearly 
stated, theoretically or empirically based assumptions about ‘directionality’: the 
directional effects that conditions would have in the counter-factual cases. QCA studies 
focusing on testing existing theory typically derive these off-the-shelf from large mature 
literatures. However, for a theory-building undertaking such as the comparative analysis 
of a new emerging group of parties, where the literature was inevitably more limited, we 
proceeded more cautiously.  
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In setting directional assumption, we drew on the limited published work on AERPs 
(largely single country case studies); our own case knowledge of the region; insights 
that can be gleaned from related literatures on new parties or populism; and careful 
consideration of patterns produced by the initial conservative solution. Reviewing our 
conditions, we concluded that four could plausibly be interpreted as contributing to 
AERP breakthroughs in either positive or negative form depending on the wider 
configuration of causes. Thus, while unstable party systems (HGENP) might (as widely 
argued in the literature) provide opportunities for new populist-type parties, stable party 
systems (~HGENP) could do the same in some contexts if they had become rigid, 
unresponsive or oligarchical (Kaltwasser 2012).  
Rising unemployment and economic contraction might, as initially anticipated, drive 
electoral discontent with establishment parties. However, examining key cases in the 
conservative solution (Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2008) we judged that in 
some contexts falling unemployment and a buoyant economy might provide a cue for 
some voters to turn away from economic issues and focus on questions of corruption 
and governance – opening up opportunities for AERPs.  
As already noted, high corruption can favour new anti-establishment parties in many 
contexts and demobilise in others. Conversely, we concluded, there might also be 
contexts where low perceived corruption could also plausibly create circumstances 
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favourable to AERP breakthrough. Low but rapidly increasing corruption (INCCORR 
*~HICORR) which appears in two of our paths (2, 4) might have an especially shocking 
and mobilising effect. We therefore set a directional expectation only for rising 
corruption (INCORR), which theoretical and empirical evidence consistently pointed to 
as favouring AERP breakthrough. 
The intermediate solution (see Table 2) enabled us to identify five distinct contexts 
favourable to AERP breakthrough. 
Table 2: Intermediate solution (BREAKTHRU) 
 
  Consistency PRI Coverage 
Unique 
coverage Cases 
1 ~NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
HICORR 
0.905 0.890 0.370 0.204 BGR01, BGR09, 
LTU00, POL01,  
SVK02, SVK10,  
SVK12 
2 ~NOGRO*INCCORR* 
HGENP 
0.841 0.810 0.351 0.105 BGR09,LTU04,  
LTU08, LTU12, 
LVA02, SVK10,  
SVK12  
3 ~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
~HICORR*INCCORR 
0.889 0.870 0.157 0.053 EST03, LTU04, 
LTU12  
4 NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.831 0.793 0.150 0.132 CZE10, HUN10,  
SVN11  
5 NOGRO*HICORR* 
INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.985 0.984 0.073 0.056 LVA11  
Consistency: 0.85, Coverage: 0.81  
Path 1: Corrupt socially painful growth (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR). This 
scenario combines rising unemployment (INCUNEMP) with economic growth 
(~NOGRO) and a background of high perceived corruption (HICORR). This 
corresponds to a context of apparently successful economic reform or restructuring, 
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whose costs and benefits are, nevertheless, seen as unjustly distributed because of 
unemployment and high levels of perceived corruption. This experience was largely 
characteristic of a phase of post-communist reform in some CEE states shortly before 
EU accession in 2000-2 (Lithuania 2000, Poland 2001, Slovakia 2002) as well as of 
Slovakia in 2010 and 2012 as it recovered from the 2008-9 recession.  
Path 2: Growth but increasing corruption in an unstable party system 
(~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP). This path, which covers Lithuania (2004-2012), 
Latvia 2002), Slovakia (2010, 2012) and Bulgaria (2009) shows economic growth 
(~NOGRO) coupled with increasing corruption (INCCORR) in an unstable party 
system (HGENP) favouring AERP breakthrough. The configuration suggests that even 
where the economy is growing, when corruption is increasing voters will turn to AERPs 
in large numbers if there is already a tradition of voting for new parties.  
Path 3: Low and rising corruption in economic good times 
(~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR). Path 3 covers three Baltic elections 
(Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2012) and like path 1 highlights how 
corruption can interact with a seemingly benign socio-economic climate. In these cases 
a favourable context for AERP breakthrough is created by low but rising corruption 
(~HICORR*INCCORR) and a buoyant economy with both growth and falling 
unemployment (~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). Increases in perceived corruption in a 
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relatively low corruption environment we suggest have a galvanising effect, while 
improvement in the economy allows voters to refocus on issues of corruption and 
governance. 
Path 4: Recession and rising corruption in rigid party systems 
(NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP). Path 4 is distinct sub-regional path 
featuring only elections in three recession-hit Visegrád states with previously stable 
party systems – Hungary in 2010, the Czech Republic in 2010 and Slovenia in 2011. 
These had been generally resistant to AERP breakthroughs until the first elections after 
the 2008-9 downturn. At this point, a configuration of recession 
(NOGRO*INCUNEMP), rising perceived corruption (INCCORR) and the previous 
stability of the established party system (~HGENP) combined to create favourable 
conditions for AERP breakthrough. In all three cases the inability of (some or all) 
established parties credibly to respond to economic crisis and their loss of legitimacy 
because of growing concerns over corruption prepared the ground for AERP 
breakthrough. Strikingly, in this configuration party stability rather than party system 
fluidity contributes to AERP breakthrough: long established parties appeared ossified, 
corrupt, out-of-touch and an obstacle to both the solution of urgent socio-economic 
problems and longer term modernisation (Batory 2010, Haughton, Novotná & Deegan-
Krause 2011, Haughton & Krašovec 2011). 
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Path 5: Latvia’s way? (NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP). The breakthrough of 
the Zatlers Reform Party in Latvia’s 2011 election appears as a unique case represented 
by its own a causal path, albeit in some ways one close to the recession and rising 
corruption in rigid party systems path experienced in Visegrád states (path I4). Here too 
economic contraction (NOGRO) combined with an increasingly stable, but oligarchical 
party establishment. However, the economic context was characterised by economic 
contraction without rising unemployment because of an unusually sharp and deep 
recession and high levels of emigration. Latvia’s path to AERP breakthrough is also 
characterised by high and increasing perceived corruption (HICORR*INCORR), rather 
than merely increasing corruption as in path 4. 
Uncovered cases 
There were a small number of unexplained cases not covered by any of the five paths or 
covered only inconsistently. In the second group we find a few cases of AERP 
breakthrough (lower half of the top right quadrant of Figure 1), which were more 
limited in scope than the highly favourable conditions would imply: Poland 2001, 
Hungary 2010, Slovakia 2012 and Lithuania 2012. As these are members of three 
different causal pathways they require follow-up in post-QCA case comparison 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 305-310). However, both in Poland 2001 and Hungary 
2010 dynamic new, social populist and/or radical right parties appeared that differed in 
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style, appeal and organisation from the niche radical right groups found in most CEE 
countries. Two cases of AERP breakthrough were wholly unexplained by our solution 
set, the most prominent being the success of the Palikot Movement (RP) in Poland’s 
2011 election, when growing unemployment, economic growth and low and falling 
corruption (INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP) should have relegated it 
to marginality.
17  
FIGURE 1 
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Concluding discussion 
This study provides a set of explanations for the anti-establishment reform parties’ 
electoral breakthroughs in ‘third generation’ elections in CEE since 1997. Our 
intermediate solution has high levels of overall consistency (0.85) and coverage (0.81) 
picks out distinct paths which can be interpreted in ways which plausibly fit case 
knowledge. This suggests that the group of parties we term AERPs does have a degree 
of coherence and should be regarded as more than a ragbag, residual category of 
otherwise hard-to-label protest parties.  
At the same time our work underlines that early debates (implicitly) framing the rise of 
such new anti-establishment parties as a reflection either of a crisis of 
(dysfunctional/corrupt) democratic governance or the impact of recession and economic 
hard times are misplaced. Instead, our findings suggest, research needs to focus on the 
ways in which economic conditions, corruption and patterns of party (in)stability 
interact to facilitate the breakthrough of these parties. In this respect our five sufficient 
causal paths offer a number of intriguing – and sometimes counterintuitive – findings. 
Corruption vs. economics 
One pattern is immediately striking: contrary to the view of AERPs as ‘crisis parties’ 
they are often not products of economic contraction. Three of the five paths to AERP 
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breakthrough covering 12 cases (combined unique coverage 0.362) take place in a 
context of economic growth. Conversely, paths 4 and 5 which feature elections taking 
place against a backdrop of economic contraction cover only four cases (combined 
unique coverage 0.188). This suggests that rather than damping down anti-political 
moods, economic good times can give voters space to consider governance issues. 
However, the presence of rising corruption (INCORR) in four of the five sufficient 
paths and the necessity of one corruption-related condition (HICORR + INCORR) 
suggests a still more different story. This is best seen in the re-presentation of the 
intermediate solution in Figure 2 which highlights the role of rising corruption as the 
most common driver of AERP breakthrough, albeit one refracted through sets of 
economic and party-political circumstances.  
FIGURE 2 
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The importance of INCORR lends qualified support to perspectives stressing the 
importance of governance structures and citizen-politician relationships, although it also 
sharply poses the question of how and when they matter. 
Spirals of instability?  
Our use of individual elections as cases allows us not only to compare across contexts, 
but also to look for temporal patterns. We can thus assess the proposition that some 
CEE party systems will experience repeated cyclical breakthroughs by new anti-
establishment parties campaigning on anti-corruption issues (Deegan-Krause 2007; 
Deegan Krause & Haughton 2009). We find qualified confirmation for this thesis. The 
pattern appears clearly in the case of Lithuania, which experienced AERP 
breakthroughs in every ‘third generation’ election in our sample. Latvia (1998, 2002), 
Slovakia (2010, 2012) and Bulgaria (2001 and 2009) which had close AERP 
breakthroughs. However, there is limited evidence of any process of ‘increasing returns’ 
of the type envisaged by Deegan-Krause (2007). There were two major linked 
breakthroughs in Bulgaria: the Simeon II Movement, which disrupted the established 
party system by breaking through in 2001 (and subsequently declined) did arguably 
prepare the ground for GERB in 2009. However, repeated breakthroughs in Lithuania 
and Slovakia did not become greater over time, suggesting that cyclical processes may 
be relatively weak or can be damped down by other factors.  
 
28 
Our solution also offers insights into the sequencing of the paths involved in repeated 
AERP breakthroughs. Most instances of multiple breakthroughs were covered by paths 
1 and 2. However, initial breakthroughs in such states (Lithuania 2000, Bulgaria 2001, 
Poland 2001, Slovakia 2002) were covered by only one path: corrupt socially painful 
growth (path 1). All cases covered by path 2 (growth with increasing corruption in an 
unstable party system) were repeat breakthroughs. This suggests that corrupt socially 
painful growth provides an important context for initial AERP breakthrough while 
rising corruption (regardless of changes in unemployment) in an already destabilised 
stable party system provides a context for further episodes. This pattern is especially 
marked in Lithuania where initial AERP breakthrough (the New Union in 2000) was 
covered only by path 1, while all subsequent breakthroughs were found in path 2. 
Party system consolidation – a double-edged sword? 
It is also striking that both party system stability and instability can contribute to AERP 
breakthrough in different economic and social contexts. Party system instability 
(HGENP) contributes to AERP breakthrough in one important causal path (path 3). 
However, counter-intuitively, we also find that party system stability (~HGENP) is in 
many circumstances conducive to AERP breakthrough. This runs contrary to much 
literature on parties and party systems in new democracies which assumes that, once 
established, stability tends to endure by triggering processes of institutionalisation 
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(Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Stable party systems in CEE thus appear a somewhat 
mercurial phenomenon which can ‘tip’ into contributing to their own demise: when 
established parties fail to deliver growth and reduce perceptions of corruption, many 
voters turn against them as oligarchical ‘dinosaurs’. Alternatively it may simply be that 
established CEE parties’ apparent sustainability was driven by repeat electoral success 
without any real processes of institutionalisation occurring.  
What can stop anti-establishment reform parties? 
Under what circumstances can stable party systems block the emergence of successful 
AERPs? Which causal configurations stymie AERP breakthrough? The absence of 
AERP breakthrough – the so-called negation of the solution (~BREAKTHRU) – 
corresponds empirically to the success of a diverse range of established parties and non-
AERP challengers. In consequence, the causal paths found in the conservative and 
intermediate solutions are complex.
18
 However, the parsimonious solution (see Table 3) 
does highlight three paths blocking AERP breakthrough, of which two have broad 
coverage.  
  
 
30 
Table 3: Parsimonious solution (~BREAKTHRU) 
  Consistency PRI Coverage Unique 
coverage 
cases  
1 ~HICORR*~INCCORR 0.849 0.840 0.414 0.328 EST99, EST07, 
HUN98,HUN02, 
HUN06,POL97, 
SVN08, POL11  
2 ~INCUNEMP*~INCCORR* 
HGENP 
0.864 0.852 0.266 0.179 BGR05, EST07, 
LVA06, SVK06 
3 NOGRO*HGENP 0.902 0.892 0.121 0.111 EST11; LVA10  
Consistency : 0.86, coverage : 0.71 
Path 1 confirms the importance of perceived corruption, suggesting that established 
parties will face no strong AERP challenge where corruption is seen as low and 
decreasing. The second path tells a similar story combining decreasing corruption and 
unemployment (~INCORR* ~INCUNEMP), but also a history of new party success 
(HGENP). This can be interpreted as AERP fatigue as all four cases on path 2 were 
preceded by the significant breakthrough by an AERP which then assumed government 
office.
19
 The surest strategy for established parties in CEE – or for those seeking to 
rescue its two decades long experiment in West European style party politics – is one 
focussed on countering perceptions of rampant and rising corruption.  
The importance of INCORR in AERP breakthroughs (and ~INCORR in non-
breakthroughs) suggests the phenomenon may be confined to regions with weak and 
corrupt (or corruptible) institutions such as Eastern or Southern Europe with limited 
potential in core West European states. Much, however, depends on whether changes in 
perceived corruption reflect the ‘real’ performance of institutions and elites. If 
 
31 
perceptions of ‘corruption’ merely mask deeper anti-political resentments we may 
expect AERPs to become a more widespread phenomenon. 
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Notes 
 
1
 We understand breakaway parties as those where a majority of parliamentary deputies 
come from a single established party. This differs slightly from Sikk (2005: 399) who 
also excludes ‘participation by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet 
ministers and members of parliament’. 
2 Similarly, comparative research on CEE radical right parties highlights factors specific 
to this group (for example, the presence of national minorities which lack relevance for 
the success of other new parties, see Bustikova & Kitschelt 2009; Piro 2014). 
3
 We classify Slovakia’s Ordinary People (OL’aNO) as an AERP in 2012, although four 
OL’aNO representatives were elected in 2010 (thanks to preference votes) on another 
party’s list. The TOP09 party is sometimes regarded as a breakaway from the Czech 
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). However, although founded by a leading figure in 
KDU-ČSL, the majority of TOP09 deputies elected in 2010 had no association with 
KDU-ČSL.  
4
 As the raw data for our conditions is continuous, we calculate set memberships 
following the direct calibration technique proposed by Ragin (2008: 85-105). 
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5
 Where two AERPs were successful we used their combined vote share for coding.  
6
 Due to data limitations, we only coded support for AERPs in cases where they entered 
the parliament. However, analysis revealed that no AERPs that did not enter the 
parliament received more than 1 percent of the vote.  
7
 We do not include the level of unemployment as a condition. Levels of background 
unemployment can vary significantly between states and, while having undeniable 
social and political impacts, can quickly become ‘normalised’. 
8
 We set the cross-over point at a marginal improvement of unemployment situation, as 
it could be argued that unemployment needs to drop by more than 0.5 percentage points 
to be perceived as improved. 
9
 Data from the Quality of Government dataset. For three elections in 1997 and 1998, 
change in corruption could not be calculated as CPI scores were unavailable. World 
Bank global governance indicators suggest that Poland and Hungary saw substantial 
reductions in corruption levels (INCCORR = 0.01), while Latvia saw modest decline in 
perceived corruption (0.33). 
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10 
Data in CPI reports is usually gathered in the year preceding the headline year. We 
applied the CPI score for the year preceding the headline year. 
11
 CPI changes should not be used to establish trends in actual levels of corruption. 
However, we believe it is acceptable to use them for the broad direction in perceived 
corruption. In the elections studied, CPI trends correspond to other indices such as 
World Bank Control of Corruption measures. Case knowledge also confirms that it is 
generally a reliable indicator. 
12 
In a number of cases the CPI score did not change. We thus followed the same logic 
as with unemployment change. We argue that the CPI score needs to decrease slightly 
before an actual improvement in corruption levels is registered among voters. 
13
 The set memberships of all elections in the causal conditions included the analysis are 
included in supplementary materials to the paper. 
14 
A consistency score of 0.9 – widely seen as minimum level at which a condition can 
be regarded as necessary (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 330) 
15
 Available at http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~tjmsasi/. 
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16
 We also reviewed these counterfactuals for empirically impossible combinations and 
‘contradictory simplifying assumptions’ (CSAs). We identified no none of the former 
and found ‘contradictory assumptions’ for which we specified whether they should lead 
to BREAKTHRU or ~BREAKTHRU (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 203-211)  
17
 The success of the Palikot Movement may be attributed to the exceptional strength of 
secular-religious divisions in Poland. 
18
 Conservative and intermediate solutions for ~BREAKTHRU are included in the 
supplementary online materials.  
19
 Res Publica in Estonia (2003), New Era in Latvia (2002), Simeon II Movement in 
Bulgaria (2001) and the Alliance of the New Citizen in Slovakia (2002). The third path 
economic contraction in an unstable party system (NOGRO*HGENP) covers only 
Latvia in 2010 and Estonia in 2011 and suggests that voters in unstable party systems 
can lose a taste for political novelty in (or shortly after) periods of economic 
contraction. 
